Book

  • Deflating Mental Representation (The Jean Nicod Lectures), MIT Press (2025). 

​Selected papers

  • Comments on Favela & Machery’s “The Concept of Representation in the Brain Sciences: The Current Status and Ways Forward,” Mind and Language, forthcoming.  pdf
  • “The Elusive Role of Normal-Proper Function in Cognitive Science,” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2022), 468-475.  pdf
  • “The We-Perspective on the Racing Sailboat,” in The Sailing Mind, Roberto Casati (ed.), Springer (2022), 131-142.  pdf
  • “A Deflationary Account of Mental Representation” in What are Mental Representations?, J. Smortchkova, K. Dolega, and T. Schlicht, (eds.), Oxford University Press (2020), 26-53.  pdf
  • “Content is Pragmatic: Comments on Nicholas Shea’s Representation in Cognitive Science,” Mind and Language 35 (2020), 368-376.  pdf
  • The Nature and Function of Content in Computational Models, in The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind,  M. Sprevak and M. Colombo (eds.), Routledge (2018), 247-258.  pdf
  • Function-Theoretic Explanation and the Search for Neural Mechanisms, in Explanation and Integration in Mind and Brain Science, David M. Kaplan (ed.), Oxford University Press (2017), 145-163.  ​​pdf
  • How to Think about Mental Content, Philosophical Studies 170 (2014), 115-135.   pdf
  • Explaining Representation: A Reply to Matthen, Philosophical Studies 170 (2014), 137-142.   pdf
  • Metaphysics and Computational Cognitive Science: Let's Not Let the Tail Wag the Dog, The Journal of Cognitive Science 13 (2012), 39-49.   pdf
  • Representationalism, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, E. Margolis, R. Samuels, and S. Stich (eds.), Oxford University Press (2012), 250-72.   pdf
  • Computational Models: A Modest Role for Content, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (special issue on Computation  and Cognitive Science) 41 (2010), 253-259.   pdf
  • Wide Content, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, A. Beckerman, B. McLaughlin, and S. Walter (eds.), Oxford University Press (2009), 351-66.   pdf
  • Is There a Role for Representational Content in Scientific Psychology?, Stich and His Critics, D. Murphy and M. Bishop (eds), Wiley-Blackwell (2009), 14-29.   pdf
  • Vision, The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (online) (2009).   pdf
  • The Content of Color Experience, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2008), 407-14.   pdf
  • Doing Cognitive Neuroscience: A Third Way, Synthese 153 (2006), 377-91.  (co-authored with Robert Matthews)   pdf
  • Naturalistic Inquiry: Where Does Mental Representation Fit In?  in Chomsky and His Critics, L. Antony and N. Hornstein (eds), Blackwell (2003), 89-104.   pdf
  • In Defense of Narrow Mindedness, Mind and Language 14 (1999), 177-94.   pdf
  • The Moon Illusion, Philosophy of Science 65 (1998), 604-23.   pdf
  • Folk Psychology and Cognitive Architecture, Philosophy of Science 62 (1995), 179-96.   pdf
  • Computation and Content, The Philosophical Review 104 (1995), 181-203.   pdf
  • Individualism, Computation, and Perceptual Content, Mind 101 (1992), 443-59.   pdf
  • Propositional Attitudes and the Language of Thought, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991), 379-88.   pdf
  • Must Psychology be Individualistic?, The Philosophical Review 100 (1991), 179-203.   pdf
  • What's Wrong with the Syntactic Theory of Mind, Philosophy of Science 56 (1989), 664-74.   pdf